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A lot of mobile applications which provided location information by using a location-based service are being developed recently.
For instance, a smart phone would find my location and destination by running a program using a GPS chip in a device. However,
the information leakage and the crime that misused the leaked information caused by the cyberattack ofmobile information system
occurred. So the interest and importance of information security are increasing. Also the number of users who has used mobile
devices in Korea is increasing, and the security of mobile devices is becoming more important. Snort detection system has been
used to detect and handle cyberattacks but the policy of Snort detection system is applied differently for each of the different kinds
of equipment. It is expected that the security of mobile information system would be improved and information leakage would be
blocked by selecting options through optimization of Snort detection policy to protect users who are using location-based service
in mobile information system environment in this paper.
1. Introduction
The importance of location-based services (LBS), which is a
wired and wireless Internet service utilizing current and past
location information of users with terminal which can track
location, is emphasized due to the development of mobile
communication technology and the rapid spread of mobile
terminals [1].
The location-based service is a service that identifies the
user’s location using Location Detection Technology and
adds related applications. I think it can be used for various
purposes, creating added value using application and location
information of wired and wireless Internet.
Also, due to the recent development of cyberattack
technology, information leakage as hacking and personal
information exposure has become a problem. There is a
high concern about exposure of personal information to the
current location due to the nature of location information
services. In the member information exposed through the
online site, personal information such as a name, a resident
registration number (ID), an address, and a resident reg-
istration number may be used for other purposes through
theft. Further, the location information of the customer
and the identification of the movement trajectory through
the location information may already act as direct privacy
violation factors. For this reason, concerns about privacy
breaches caused by leakage of location-based services are
more serious in Korea [2–4].
The key to security monitoring is rapid detection of
cyberattacks. Among the various security monitoring sys-
tems, a network-based intrusion detection system (IDS) is
the only system that can detect application attacks such as
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Table 1: Location-based service utilization [5].
Sort Field of application Benefit
(1) Tracking the location of a young or demented elderly Missing child prevention, accident prevention
(2) Tracking your pet location Lost, accident prevention
(3) Vehicle navigation Identifying the route of the vehicle
(4) Location of field rep Effective management of field rep
(5) Providing information about the current location Nearby information services such as theaters, gas stations, restaurants
(6) Police, security, military vehicle management Crime prevention
(7) Providing location information of courier and cargo Reducing oil, transportation, and communication costs
web hacking most efficiently by installing them between the
control network entrances. The function of the intrusion
detection system (IDS) is to use a pattern matching method
that detects an attack and generates an alarm when a header
or Payload information communicating through the network
is detected as an attack.
However, if an attacker encrypts communication signals
due to attack packets or malicious code infections, the
intrusion detection system (IDS) only checks the encrypted
packets. Even if the attack packet is an actual attack packet,
it cannot be detected and waypoint also cannot be detected.
In order to detect such an attack, it is necessary to develop a
behavior-based detection system that can detect and alert an
attack using an unknown attack technique instead of a pattern
matching methods [6–8].
Currently, security monitoring technology analyzes
cyberattack techniques and malicious codes, extracts
patterns such as certain strings, and then uses this pattern
to develop detection patterns (signature) and apply them to
intrusion detection systems. After that, if the cyberattack
information matches the detection pattern, it is detected as
an accident. If the attack technique is changed, the detection
pattern should be corrected in a timely manner so as to
maintain the optimized state. However, it is not easy to detect
new attacks or malicious codes.
In addition, recent cyberattack techniques such as hack-
ing and distribution of malicious code are developing rapidly
and utilizing advanced and intelligent techniques such as
double encryption technique to prevent detection by security
monitoring or vaccine. So it is not enough to completely
detect and block new cyberattacks.
Therefore, in order to efficiently detect and respond to
cyberattacks in systems that utilize location-based services
in mobile information systems, it is necessary to optimize
security monitoring detection techniques to share informa-
tion among security monitoring centers or to standardize
detection patterns according to heterogeneous equipment.
2. Related Work
2.1. Location-Based Service. LBS is an acronym for location-
based service. It is generally defined as an application system
and service that accurately grasps the location of a person
or object based on the mobile communication network and
utilizes it. Accordingly, the LBS is a system that grasps the
location information of an individual or a vehicle through
a mobile communication base station and a GPS (Global
Positioning System) and provides various advanced services
based on the information [1].
LBS provides various application services based on loca-
tion information. These include emergency assistance, loca-
tion information services, traffic congestion and navigation
information, and location-based billing. Other applications
include Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), assistive devices
for people with disabilities, L-Commerce based on location
information, and cell ID-based friends using cell phones (see
Table 1).
The current location information acquisition technology
of the wireless communication network enables collecting
more precise location information by combining theGPS and
other location positioning technology and wireless commu-
nication network, and it is possible to provide more various
application services. As the location information is connected
with the mobile communication network, it is possible to
provide a general service in the future, and the application
service structure provided in the network is changing from
a wired/wireless communication network structure with an
independent vertical structure to a horizontal structure for
wired/wireless integration. Also, all network entities will
evolve into an open converged network that provides services
based on an equalized All-IP network. Through the develop-
ment of position location system such as A-GPS (Assistance-
GPS) and the paradigm change of ubiquitous and pervasive
computing environment, MT (Mobile Terminal) will become
a subject of information provision independently and will
develop its form to deliver its location information to LBS SP
(Service Provider). With these developments, it is necessary
to provide the components of location-based services with
safety and reliability beyond the conventional wired and
wireless network level.
2.2. Intrusion Detection System. Intrusion detection system
(IDS) was introduced in 1980 by James Enderson of the
United States in a paper called “Computer Security Threat
Monitoring and Surveillance.” In 1986, Dorothy Denning
published an article entitled “An Intrusion DetectionModel”
and was influenced by IDS.
Intrusion detection systems can reduce the misuse detec-
tion and improve the performance of the system by designing
efficient and complete detection rules for cyberthreats. Rules
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should be as simple and flexible as possible and handle large
amounts of network traffic without packet loss. This requires
testing procedures to assess the appropriateness before apply-
ing the developed rules and periodic optimization to speed up
the rules.
For exact detection rules, you must test them before
applying them in the intrusion detection system (IDS).
Inaccurate rules cause too many false positives and false
negatives. A large number of false detection events may
cause unnecessary analysis time, prevent detection of normal
attack events, or cause the network sensor of the IDS to
go down. In order to reduce false detection events, test
procedures are required before the system is applied. When
testing, efficiency, usability, accuracy, and uniqueness should
be considered.
In addition, false positives should be reduced. False
positive events occur when you configure detection rules
extensively or when you activate unnecessary rules. In order
to reduce this, we need to rigorously apply detection rules
through precise analysis of the exploit. In addition, it disables
the detection rules of the simple information providing
format such as “ICMP UNREACH” to reduce the load of the
cyberthreat attack event. Inaccurate rules flood false positives
and generate false negatives. A large number of false detection
events may cause unnecessary analysis time and may prevent
detection of cyberthreat attack events.
Until now, the term “security monitoring” has not been
defined as a legal rule. In recent years, it has been a step in the
process of conceptualization in the academic sense.The term
“security control” is used in English as “SecurityMonitoring”
or “SecurityMonitoring & Control.”The dictionary meaning
of “Monitoring” is to protect against various errors that may
occur during computer program execution. And the Korean
dictionary of the Korean language states that “control”means
“to control and control by necessity at a country or an airport”
[9] (see Figure 1).
2.3. Intrusion Detection System. The Snort intrusion detec-
tion system is one of the most widely used systems among
intrusion detection systems (IDS) and is an open source
network-based intrusion detection system (open source
NIDS) [12–14].
The rule is divided into Header and Option. As shown in
(Figure 2), detailed rules can be distinguished as conditions
to be detected in the detection operation, protocol type,
source address, source port, traffic transmission direction,
destination IP address, and destination port. The elements
used in these detailed rules are summarized as shown in
Figure 2.
The Rule Header of Snort is an integral part of the detec-
tion rule that includes five elements: Rule Action, Protocol,
Source, Destination IP, Source, Destination Port, and Traffic
Direction. Rule Action specifies what the rule should do if the
packet matches the rule. Snort has rule actions such as “pass,
log, alert,” but in most cases it uses the alert Rule Action [15–
18] (see Table 2).
Snort’s rule options are divided into General, Payload
Detection, and Nonpayload Detection rule options as shown
in Table 3.
3. Optimization of Selected Snort-Based
Detection Rule
3.1. Header Detection Rule Optimization. In Rule Action,
“alert” generates a warning, “log” leaves a log, “pass” ignores
the packet, “activate” sends a warning and activates the
specified dynamic rule, and “drop” throws away the packet
and leaves a log. Also “reject” leaves the connection and
log, and “sdrop” discards the packet and leaves no log. Of
these, 6 items including “log,” “pass,” “activate,” “dynamic,”
“reject,” and “sdrop” are excluded. For this reason, “log” and
“pass” are options for packet logging or packet ignoring.
“Activate” and “dynamic” are used mainly for additional
logging after detection of attack. They are not suitable for the
purpose of notifying the occurrence of attack. “Reject” and
“sdrop” are excluded because they are additional actions after
interception.
In the protocol, “tcp,” “udp,” “icmp,” and “ip” support
the TCP, UDP, ICMP, and IP protocols, respectively. In the
protocol, “tcp” supports the TCP protocol, “udp” supports
the UDP protocol, “icmp” supports the ICMP protocol, and
“ip” supports the IP protocol (see Table 4).
In IP, “any” represents All-IP address targets, “numeric
IP” represents a specific IP address target, “numeric IP
list” supports up to 10, including CIDR among multiple IP
addresses, “CIDR” represents the length object of a specific
network address, and “negation(!)” represents All-IP address
destinations except the specified IP address. In port, “any”
represents all port number targets, “static port” represents
fixed port number targets, “ranges(:)” represents port range
targets, and “negation(!)” represents all port destinations
except for specified ports. In Direction, “-> option” indicates
the direction of the destination host from the source host, and
“<> option” indicates the direction of both the source host
and the destination host. The <- option lowers the detection
efficiency by generating a lot of intrusion detection sensor
load. Also, “<-” is to remove the mandatory option because
it is necessary to use the -> option by changing the source IP
and destination IP (see Table 5).
3.2. General Rule Optimization. In General, “msg” is used
as an option to indicate a message to be recorded when
detecting security control events. “Reference” is a reference to
additional information, “gid” is the ID of the alert generation
module, sid is used to identify the Snort detection rule,
“<100” is the number reserved for future use, “100–1,000,000”
indicates the number assigned by Snort, and “>1,000,000”
represents a user-defined rule assignment number. “Rev”
keyword indicates information about the revision of the sid,
“classtype” identifies information that can classify the attack,
and “priority” indicates the importance of the rule. In Gen-
eral, all options excluding “msg” are excluded.The “reference”
case is excluded as an additional option for reference of
detection rule information. “Gid” and “sid” are excluded
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Table 2: Definition of Snort Header detection rules [4].
Snort instruction format Definition
Header
Rule Action
alert Generate Alert
log Leave log
pass Ignore pat
activate Send alerts and activate dynamic rules
dynamic It is activated by the activate rule and the Log option
drop Drop a packet and leave a log
reject Connection terminated and logged
drop Discard packets and leave no logs
Protocol
tcp TCP protocol support
udp UDP protocol support
icmp ICMP protocol support
ip IP protocol support
IP
any All IP address
numeric IP Specific IP addresses
numeric IP list Multiple IP addresses
CIDR
Specific network class destination
(i) Class A Network (8 bits)
(ii) Class B Network (16 bits)
(iii) Class C Network (24 bits)
negation(!) All IP addresses except the specified IP address
Port
any All port numbers
static port Fixed Port Number
ranges(:) Port range destination
negation(!) All ports except the specified port
Direction
-> From the origin host to the destination host
<- Change the source and destination information and specify to “->”
bidirectional(<>) Bidirectional detection support
Internet
Firewall
NIDSNIDS
Figure 1: NIDS network [9].
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Figure 2: Snort basic rule set [10, 11].
from Snort configuration module as indicating module ID
and detection rule ID that generated warning. Also, “rev” is
excluded as an option for version control of detection rules,
and “classtype” and “priority” are excluded due to lack of
usability as an option for sorting and prioritizing detection
rules (see Table 6).
3.3. Payload Detection and Nonpayload Detection Rule Opti-
mization. In Payload Detection (Content, Content Modi-
fier), “content” indicates the specific content to be found
in the Payload of the packet, and “nocase” means not case
sensitive. “Rawbytes” ignores the decoding process and indi-
cates raw packet data inspection, offset indicates the pattern
search start position, depth indicates the pattern search range,
distance indicates a new pattern search start position after
the previous pattern matching, and within indicates the
pattern search range. The http client body searches in the
body part of the HTTP request. The http cookie searches in
the cookie part of theHTTPheader.Thehttp header searches
in the HTTP header part. The http method searches in the
HTTP method part. The http uri part searches the HTTP
URI part in the fast pattern Eye. This is the command to
designate the pattern to search first. However, HTTP related
commands can be specified with the content option and
can be excluded. Fast pattern excludes string matching as a
priority (see Table 7).
In Payload Detection, “uricontent” searches patterns
from URI information of HTTP, “urilen” checks HTTP
URI length, and “isdataat” searches whether Payload has
a certain number of bytes. “Pcre” searches for a regular
expression, byte test compares it to a specific value after a
certain byte operation, and “byte jump” jumps to a result
value after a certain byte operation. “Ftpbounce” detects an
FTP bounce attack, “asn1” detects a malicious encoding, and
“cvs” detects an invalid entry string in CVS. Also, “dce iface,”
“dce opnum,” and “dce stup data” detect the DCE/RPC
request traffic pattern. Of these, “urilen” is excluded because
it can be specified usingmandatory options, and “ftpbounce,”
“asn1,” “cvs,” “dce-iface,” “dce-opnum,” and “dce stup data”
commands should be excluded because these are the options
for detecting specific attacks on specific services (see Table 8).
Among the Nonpayload Detection options, the com-
mands related to IP such as fragoffset, fragbits, tos, id,
ipopts, and TCP related commands seq, ack, and windows
are excluded because they are not useful in creating detection
rules (see Table 9).
In Nonpayload Detection, “dsize” checks packet payload
size to detect packets of abnormal size, and “flow” defines
packet direction in relation to client-server communication
stream. “Flowbits” is an option to support session-based
detection, and “Rpc” acts to identify the rpc service but it is
excluded because it can be specifiedusingmandatory options.
The “sameip” checks whether the source and destination
IPs are the same, and the “stream size” checks the size
of the session according to the TCP sequence number,
but it is excluded because it can be specified through the
“dsize” option. In Rule Thresholds, “Limit” indicates the
first occurrence of a warning when a number of identical
events occur within a certain time, and “Threshold” indicates
a warning when the number of the same events occurring
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Table 3: Definition of Snort option detection rules [4].
Snort instruction format Definition
Option
General
msg Message to record when Alert or logging
reference References to additional information
gid Alert generation module id
sid Use to distinguish snort detection rules
rev Display information about revision of rule with sid
classtype Information that can classify an attack
priority Show the importance (priority) of detection rules
Payload Detection
content Specific content looking for in the payload of a packet
content modifier
nocase Not classifying capital and small letter
rawbytes Ignore the decoding process and check the raw packet data
offset Specify whether to start pattern search after the first few bytes of the packet
depth Specify how to compare pattern search from offset to how many bytes
distance Specify whether to start pattern after how many bytes from previous pattern matching.
within Specify how to compare pattern searches from distance to how many bytes
http client body Search in body part of HTTP request
http cookie Search in the cookie portion of the HTTP header
http header Search in the HTTP header section
http method Search in the HTTP methods section
http uri Search in the HTTP URI section
fast pattern Specify the pattern to search first
uricontent Retrieve patterns from URI information in HTTP
urilen Check HTTP URI length
isdataat Checks if the payload has a certain number of bytes
pcre Search by regular expression
byte test Compare with specific value after specific byte operation
byte jump Jump as much as the operation result value after a certain byte operation
ftpbounce FTP bounce attack detection
asn1 Detect malicious encoding
cvs Detect invalid Entry string in CVS
dce iface
Detect traffic pattern requesting DCE/RPCdce opnum
dce stup data
Non-Payload Detection
IP
fragoffset IP fragment offset field check
fragbits IP fragment offset field check
tos IP Service type field check
id IP identification field check
ttl IP Time To Live field check
ip proto IP protocol inspection
ipopts IP Options field check
TCP
seq TCP sequence number check
ack TCP acknowledge number check
flags TCP flag bit field check
window TCP window size check
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Table 3: Continued.
Snort instruction format Definition
ICMP
itype ICMP type check
icode ICMP code check
icmp id ICMP identification check
icmp seq ICMP sequence number check
dsize Detect the payload size of packets to detect abnormal size packets
flow Defines the direction of the packet in relation to the client-server communication stream
flowbits Options to support session-based detection
rpc rpc service identification
sameip Check if origin and destination IP are the same
stream size Check the size of the session according to the TCP sequence number
Thresholding
limit Only the first warning occurs when multiple identical events occur within a certain time
threshold Alert when the number of the same events that occur within a certain time is exceeded
Table 4: Optimization of Header Rules: Rule Action, Protocol.
Command format Selection of detection rule standardization
Rule Action alert Generate a warning
drop Drop the packet and leave a log
Protocol
tcp TCP protocol support
udp UDP protocol support
icmp ICMP protocol support
ip IP protocol support
Command format Excluded detection rules standardized/excluded reasons
Rule Action
log Logged It is an option for packet logging or packet override, which
is mainly used for logging after attack detection, but it is
for the purpose of notifying the occurrence of an attackpass Ignore packets
activate Send an alert and activate thespecified dynamic rule
This option is used for additional logging after detection of
an attack, but it is consistent with the purpose of notifying
the occurrence of the attackdynamic It is activated by the activate ruleand acts like the log option
reject Connection terminated andlogged Added after Intrusion rrevention and exclude as action
sdrop Discards packets and leaves nologs
Table 5: Optimization of Header Rules: IP, Port, Direction.
Command format Selection of detection rule standardization
IP
any All IP address
numeric IP Specific IP addresses
numeric IP list Multiple IP address up to 10 including CIDR
CIDR The length of a specific network address.
Port
any all port numbers
static port Fixed Port Number
ranges(;) Port range destination
Direction -> Direction from the origin host to the destination host
<> Origin host and destination host bidirectional
Command format Excluded detection rules standardized/excluded reasons
Direction <- Source Host andDestination Host Reverse
It is excluded because it can be made by changing source
IP and destination IP and generate load
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Table 6: Optimization of General Rules.
Command format Selection of detection rule standardization
General msg Message to record when detecting
Command format Excluded detection rules standardized/excluded reasons
General
reference References to additionalinformation
Excluded as an additional option for reference of detection rule
information
gid Alert generation module id
Except for the module ID of the configuration module and the ID
of the detection rule (Snort-specific function)sid
Use to distinguish Snort
detection rules
<100 reserved number for
future use
100–1,000,000 number
assigned by Snort
>1,000,000 custom rule
assignment numbers
rev Information on revision ofrules with sid Excluded as an option for versioning of detection rules
classtype Information that canclassify an attack
Excluded as an option for risk display and classification of
detection
priority Significance of detectionrules (top/middle/bottom)
Exclude as an option for indicating the importance of detection
rules
Table 7: Optimization of Payload Detection (Content, Content Modifier) Rules.
Command format Selection of detection rule standardization
Payload Detection
content Specific content to look for in the payload of a packet
nocase Case insensitive
rawbytes Ignore the decoding process and check raw packet data
offset Pattern search start position (after the first few bytes of the packet)
depth Pattern search range (compare pattern search from offset to several bytes)
distance New pattern search start position after a previous pattern match (after a few bytes)
within Pattern search range (compare pattern search from distance to several bytes)
Command format Excluded detection rules standardized/excluded reasons
Payload Detection
http client body Search in body part ofHTTP request
Except for the content option
http cookie
Search in the cookie
portion of the HTTP
header
http header Search in the HTTP headersection
http method Search in the HTTPmethods section
http uri Search in the HTTP URIsection
fast pattern Specify the pattern tosearch first Excluded as string matching from specified priority
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Table 8: Optimization of Payload Detection Rules.
Command format Selection of detection rule standardization
Payload Detection
isdataat Check if the payload has a certain number of bytes
pcre Search by regular expression
byte test Compare with specific value after specific byte operation
uricontent Search patterns from URI information in HTTP
Command format Excluded detection rules standardized/excluded Reasons
Payload Detection
urilen Check HTTP URI length Excluded as assignable opting using mandatory option
ftpbounce FTP bounce attack detection
Excluded as assignable opting using mandatory option
asn1 Detect malicious encoding
cvs Detect invalid Entry String in CVS
dce iface
DCE/RPC request traffic pattern detectiondce opnum
dce stup data
Table 9: Optimization of Nonpayload Detection Rules 1.
Command format Selection of detection rule standardization
Nonpayload Detection (IP) ttl Inspect IP Time-To-Live field
ip proto Inspect IP protocol field
Nonpayload Detection
(TCP) flags Inspect TCP flag bit field
Nonpayload Detection
(ICMP)
itype Inspect ICMP type
icode Inspect ICMP code
icmp id Inspect ICMP identification field
icmp seq Inspect ICMP sequence number
Command format Excluded detection rules standardized/excluded reasons
Nonpayload Detection (IP)
fragoffset Inspect IP fragment Offsetfield
It is excluded through
consultation with related companies,
Because it is not useful in
creating detection rule
fragbits
Check whether IP
fragmentation and reserved
bits are set
tos Inspect IP Service type field
id Inspect IP identificationfield
ipopts Inspect IP Options field
Nonpayload Detection (TCP)
seq Inspect TCP Sequencenumber
ack Inspect TCP acknowledgenumber
window Inspect TCP window size
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Table 10: Optimization of Nonpayload Detection Rules 2.
Command format Standardization of detection rules Candidates for selection
Nonpayload Detection
dsize Packet detection of abnormal size by checking the packet’s payload size
flow Defines the direction of the packet in relation to the client-servercommunication stream
flowbits Options to support session-based detection
Rule Thresholds
Limit Alert for the first time when multiple identical events occur within acertain time
Threshold Alert when the number of the same events that occur within a certaintime is exceeded
Command format Excluded detection rules standardized/excluded Reasons
Nonpayload Detection
rpc Identify the rpc service
It identifies the rpc service, but it can be
specified using mandatory options. It can be
specified through the dsize option.
sameip Check if origin anddestination IP are the same
stream size
Check the size of the
session according to the
TCP sequence number
within a certain time exceeds the corresponding number.
Threshold option was used before Snort 2.8.5 version; Snort
2.8.5.1 or later uses Detection Filter or Event Filters option
(see Table 10).
4. Comparison Analysis of Existing Snort
Detection Options
Optimizing the existing Snort detection grammar will allow
the user to understand and analyze the wrong type of
policy created without considering the performance and false
positives of the detection sensor in the event of a vulnerability
attack. Also this can elaborate detection rules. In order to
normalize the detection rules; first, if short strings are applied,
frequent detection of the intrusion detection system sensor
occurs, thereby degrading the performance of the intrusion
detection system sensor. Therefore, it is necessary to create a
policy that detects a string of at least 4 bytes or more. Second,
when a communication string is detected frequently, a large
number of detection events are generated, which may cause
a false alarm, and the performance of the detection sensor
may be reduced, thereby limiting communication traffic in a
typical Internet environment.Third, in the PCRE grammar, .
(Dot), ∗ (Asterisk) is a special character that matches any
string. Because thismatchingmatches all strings in the packet
Payload, the PCRE computation consumes a lot of system
resources and leaks from the intrusion detection system
sensor. Fourth, if the setting value exceeds the detection
string length limit of the intrusion detection system sensor,
it may cause a problem that it cannot be detected. In
addition, long length PCRE matching causes performance
load of the intrusion detection system sensor. Fifth, when
searching a continuous pattern of the same character, a
looping phenomenon may occur as repeated operations are
performed, which causes a heavy load on the CPU usage.
Therefore, there is a purpose to improve these five problems
by optimizing Snort detection grammar (see Table 11).
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to find a detection rule opti-
mization method for protecting users who use location-
based services inmobile information systems and proving the
compatibility of detection rules between different intrusion
detection systems (IDS/IPS) introduced in each security
control center (cybersafety center) based on IDS Snort in
order to prepare for new cyberthreats and cyberattacks.
Recent hacking technologies understand cyberattack
packet contents in order to detect new cyberthreats that are
developing rapidly and present the best intrusion detection
rules for network environment. Based on the Snort detection
rules, we designed the models and options of the essential
detection rules and suggested the most optimized detec-
tion rule production standards through understanding and
analyzing the wrong policies such as the performance of
the detection sensor and the policy that does not consider
the false positives. In this paper, we propose an efficient
detection and countermeasure of new cyberattacks through
the Snort-based detection rule standard requirements. Also,
constructing a standardized security management system of
the heterogeneous intrusion detection system bymaintaining
the optimization state by correcting and revising the detec-
tion pattern according to the actual situation of each security
control center is possible.
This standardization of integrated intrusion detection
pattern is expected to establish an efficient operation system
of each security control center (cybersafety center) perform-
ing security control.
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Table 11: Comparison of Snort Detection Rules and Optimization Options.
Detection rule options Snort Detection ruleoptimization grammar selection
Header (24/17)
Rule Actions (8/2)
alert O O
log O X
pass O X
activate O X
dynamic O X
drop O O
reject O X
sdrop O X
Protocols (4/4)
tcp O O
udp O O
icmp O O
ip O O
IP (5/5)
any O O
numeric IP O O
numeric IP list O O
CIDR O O
negation(!) O O
Port (4/4)
any O O
static port O O
ranges(:) O O
negation(!) O O
Direction (3/2)
-> O O
<- O X
bidirectional(<>) O O
Option (47/24)
Meta Data (6/1)
msg O O
reference O X
sid O X
rev O X
classtype O X
priority O X
Payload Detection (19/12)
content O O
content modifier
Nocase O O
Rawbytes O O
Depth O O
Offset O O
Distance O O
Within O O
http client body O X
http uri O X
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Table 11: Continued.
Detection rule options Snort Detection ruleoptimization grammar selection
http header O X
http cookie O X
uricontent O O
isdataat O O
pcre O O
byte test O O
byte jump O O
ftpbounce O X
asn1 O X
regex O X
Non Payload Detection (20/9)
fragoffset O X
ttl O O
tos O X
id O X
ipopts O X
fragbits O X
dsize O O
flags O O
flow O O
flowbits O O
seq O X
ack O X
window O X
itype O O
icode O O
icmp id O O
icmp seq O O
rpc O X
ip proto O X
sameip O X
Thresholding (2/2)
limit O O
threshold O O
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